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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE END OF PRIVATE
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING THROUGH
REVIVAL OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
(42 U.S.C. § 1982)
1. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1866
A. SOCIAL HISTORY
After the Civil War, Negroes tested their newly obtained
freedoms and found they were not prepared to cope with
many of the problems encountered. Although they had gain-
ed their freedom, "slavery [had] left the Negroes illiterate and
untrained for the responsibilities of freedom"; and they were
characterized as loving "idleness," having "no keen concep-
tion of right and wrong," liking "'ease and comfort'" and
concerned more with their present than future environment.1
However, the fact remains that Negroes wanted to own their
own land.2 They wandered around looking for their "forty
acres" and had a longing "for the feel of their own plows
tilling their own soil."'3
While there was plenty of cheap land available, it was
said that sales to Negroes were not consummated because they
wanted to buy "a choice spot in the midst of the plantation"
or they had made "some other unreasonable demand" for
which a sale to a "white man" would also have been denied;4
thus implying that the refusal to sell was not based solely on
racial discrimination. Although there were some persons in
the North and South who felt a Negro should not "become the
outright owner of land anywhere," the majority of whites felt
favorable toward "Negro ownership of land if they got it in
1 8 COULTER, TiE SOUTH DURMG RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at
49 (1947) [hereinafter cited as COULTER].
2 Id. at 59, 107.
3 Id. at 109.
4 Id. at 111.
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a legal way."5 This alleged feeling of the white man as to
Negroes' rights to acquire property is questionable when
viewed in light of then existing legislation.
When the new state governments in the South had be-
come fully organized and functional there developed the so-
called "Black Codes"; which, especially the more elaborate
ones, dictated what the Negro could and could not do with
his newly gained freedom.6
The Negro as a slave had been property; he had no
rights, civil or political. The mere act of setting him
free still left him without these rights; he was still not
a citizen. It was a problem of first importance to nurse
him into the responsibilities of a free citizenship
among a population which had always been free. He
must be protected against the whites and himself no
less than the whites against him.7
Many of the people in the North were aware of these
"Black Codes" and saw them as an attempt to return the
Negro to slavery.8 These Codes, in many cases, had the ef-
fect of placing the Negro under the same property right re-
strictions that had faced him as a slave.9 In this position
the Negro was generally denied the right to freely enter
some types of contracts, carry a firearm, sit on juries, sue and
be sued, and buy and sell property.10
Also during this time the country was undergoing a period
of reconstruction and unification under the guidance of Presi-
5 Id.
6 Id. at 39-40.
7 Id. at 38.
8 Avin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, The Civil Rights Bill
of 1966, and The Right to Buy Property, 40 S. CAL. L. REv.
274, 292 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Avins]; COULTER 39;
J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF T=E FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 163 (1954) [hereinafter cited as TENBROEK].
9 Avins 292; COULTER 39.
10 See, e.g., COULTER 39-40; See generally, Avins 280-87 (re-
view of cases and materials on the property rights of slaves).
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dent Andrew Johnson, a Southerner who had retained his
basic understanding of the South and its Negro problem even
though he had been exposed to the North and had undergone
four years of extreme Unionism." When President Johnson
formulated his reconstruction policies, he did not want to
bother with calling a special session of Congress; consequently,
that body did not assemble until the regular session, some
eight months later.12 In light of this fact and the reconstruc-
tion programs which had been instituted, a number of con-
gressmen formed a rising opposition to the President's deal-
ings with the South, even before Congress convened on De-
cember 5, 1865.13
These were some of the conditions which made up the
atmosphere in which the 39th Congress would conduct its busi-
ness, a part of which included the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress, since 1838, had been involved in intermittent
discussions on what power they had to enact legislation to
abolish slavery. The majority of the abolitionists felt that Con-
gress did not have the constitutional power to abolish slavery
by direct legislation; the minority felt that the national power
vested in Congress, in light of our federal system, was suf-
ficient to allow legislation for the abolition of slavery through-
out the country.' 4 Then, on December 14, 1863, the House re-
ceived a proposal for a constitutional amendment that would
effectively abolish slavery throughout the nation.", After the
congressional debates in the spring of 1864 and January, 1865,
the proposed amendment was sent to the states for ratification.
" CouL -a 34.
12 Id. at 32.
1' Id. at 41.
14 TENBROEK 68-70.
15 Id. at 138.
(Vol. 6, No. 2
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It was ratified and became law on December 18, 1865, as the
thirteenth amendment.'6
For those abolitionists who had felt Congress had the
power to abolish slavery by direct legislation, this new amend-
ment was merely declaratory; but for the majority of the
abolitionists, it was felt to be amendatory. The majority's
view was that it took the power over slavery from the states,
abolished slavery throughout the Nation, and made freedom
a national right with Congress having the power of enforce-
ment. However, regardless of the label placed on it, the feel-
ing of all abolitionists was that Congress now had power to
protect persons from bondage and in addition to provide a
wide range of natural and constitutional rights.17
Shortly before and after the adoption of the thirteenth
amendment, three bills were sponsored in the Senate aimed
at declaring null and void the antebellum slave codes and
discriminatory laws which were in existence; but all three
were too narrow in scope1s Before the first of these pro-
posals was defeated, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, stated that if it was defeated, he
would introduce a bill that would be more efficient in pro-
tecting the rights of the freedmen since, "It is idle to say
that a man is free . . . who cannot buy and sell [proper-
ty] . . . ." Trumbull felt that such legislation would have
its authority in the second section of the thirteenth amend-
ment.19 Then on January 5, 1866, Senator Trumbull introduced
the civil rights bill which was later to become the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.2
10 13 Stat. 774 (1865).
'7 TENBROEK 152-55.
18 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 91 (1866), [herein-
after cited as CONG. GLOBE], citecd in Jones v. Alfred H. May-
er Co., 392 U.S. 409, 429 (1968); TENBrOEK 158, 159.
'0 CONG. GLOBE 43, cited in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 430 (1968); Avins 293; TENBROEK 159.
2 CONG. GLOBE 129, cited in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 431 (19938); TEBRom 160,
1970]
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During the Senate debates that followed, much was said
about the purpose, propriety and scope of this proposed leg-
islation. As to the purpose, Senator Trumbull stated that it
would effectively "destroy all the discriminations" which were
created by the antebellum slave codes.21 He also said that this
bill would give to all man "the right to acquire property, the
right to go and come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights
in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose
of property. '22 On the propriety of the bill, Senator Trumbull,
in referring to section two of the thirteenth amendment, stated
that:
The second clause of that amendment was inserted
for . . . the purpose, and none other, of preventing
State Legislatures from enslaving, under any pre-
tense, those whom the first clause declared should
be free.2 *
21 CONG. GLOBE 322, cited in Avins 293. The full statement
was: "When the constitutional amendment was adopted
and slavery abolished, all these statutes became null and
void, because they were all passed in aid of slavery, for
the purpose of maintaining and supporting it. Since the
abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled
in the insurrectionary states have passed laws relating to
the freemen, . . . which deny them certain rights, subject
them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the
very restrictions which were imposed upon them in con-
sequence of the existence of slavery, and before it was
abolished. The purpose of the bill is to destroy all these
discriminations, and to carry into effect the constitutional
amendment." CONG. GLOBE 474, cited in Avins 293, 294.
22 CONG GLOBE: 474, cited in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 432 (1968); Avins 294.
2 CoNG. GLOBE 43, cited in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 455 (1968) (dissent).
The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress. shall have power to enforce this ar-
ticle by appropriate legislation.
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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When Senator Trumbull was questioned on the scope of
the bill, he responded that section two, which imposed crim-
inal sanctions for violation of the enumerated rights in section
one, would "have no operation in any state where the laws are
equal."24 He also stated that section two of the civil rights bill
was to punish "not state officers especially, but everybody
24 CONG GLOBE 476, cited in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 459 (1968).
Original form of Civil Rights Act of 1866:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, that all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power,. . are hereby declared
to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of
every race and color, without regard to any previous con-
dition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have
the same right in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penal-
ties, and to none other, any law, statutes, ordinance, reg-
ulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Section 2. That any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject,
or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or pro-
tected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or
penalties on account of such person having at any time
been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color
or race, than is prescribed for the punishment oft white
persons, shall be deemed guilty of. a misdemeanor, and,
on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Act of April 9;-1866, ch. 31,.-§ 1,-14 Stat. 27.
19701
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who violates the law. It is the intention to punish everybody
who violates the law."25
Following the Senate's passage of the Civil Rights Act,
it was sponsored in the House by Representative James Wil-
son. During the first House debate, Wilson, in explaining the
bill, made the following statement:
[I]t will be observed that the entire structure of
this bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil
rights and immunities made by the states on 'account
of race, color or previous condition of slavery.'2 0
He further stated:
[W]e may protect a citizen of the United States
against a violation of his rights by the law of a sin-
gle state; . . . this power permeates our whole sys-
tem, is a part of it, without which the States can run
riot over every fundamental right belonging to the
citizens of the United States.2 7
Representative Wilson e x p r e s s e d these same views
throughout the House debates.
The bill was passed by the House on March 13, 1866.28
President Johnson vetoed the Act. Congress overrode his veto
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 became law.20
Although the cited excerpts of the congressional debates
are not conclusive, it is believed that they are the best evi-
dence of the legislative purpose of this Act since they were
20 CONG GLOBE 500, cited in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 458 (1968).
26 Id. at 1118, 392 U.S. at 465.
27 Id. at 1119.
28 Id. at 1367.
29 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. The pertinent
part of this Act which remains today is found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 and provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
leame, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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made by the two men (its originator and chief advocate in
the Senate and its sponsor in the House) who were primarily
responsible for explaining it to the other members of the
Congress. From the debates and general background, it seems
that the Act was intended to abolish the antebellum slave
codes and other Acts of the State rather than to prohibit purely
private racial discrimination.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR GIVING EFFECT TO
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
A. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The congressional debates, in the spring of 1864 and in
January, 1865, which led to the thirteenth amendment's rati-
fication show that its advocates and opponents agreed that
it would "evolutionize the federal system."30 Another aid in
determining the effect of the amendment was that the aboli-
tionists were not sure whether it would have a declaratory
or amendatory function. As previously mentioned, even though
this ambiguity existed, there was little uncertainty among
the abolitionists as to the power it conferred on Congress.31
The Senate debates indicate that there w e r e a few who
wanted to give a narrow construction to this amendment.
Several Senators expressed the desire that section one cover
only the master-Negro slave relationship and section two
cover the right of the Negro to the privilege of habeas cor-
pus.3 2 However, the prevailing view was that this amendment
would be much b r o a d e r in its scope than indicated by
its simple language. The consensus of its drafters and spon-
sors was that it would not only remove the bonds of the
physical person, but that it would al s o restore his "na-
tural, inalienable, and civil rights"; which is another way
30 TwBioEE 147, 148.
31 Id. at 152-55.
32 CONG. GLOBE 499 (Senator Cowan); Id. at 113, 476 (Senator




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 6 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss2/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
of saying that he would be given the privileges and im-
munities of a citizen of the United States.33
In view of the previously mentioned statements of Sena-
tor Trumbull and Representative Wilson and in view of other
statements made during the debates in both the Senate and
the House as to the propriety of the civil rights bill, it seems
reasonable to infer that the majority opinion was t h a t
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could be given effect under
the power granted to Congress by the thirteenth amend-
ment.3 4 If the purpose of the civil rights bill was to end all ra-
cial discrimination except that of a purely private nature and
to effectively destroy the discriminatory acts which denied
the same civil rights to all, including the right to buy, sell
and own both real and personal property, then its applica-
tion under this amendment would seem to be appropriate.
However, it appears highly improbable that either Senator
Trumbull or Representative Wilson would have viewed an in-
dividual's refusal to sell his realty to another because of his
race as creating an act of slavery which would have violated
this amendment.
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
From the time the fourteenth amendment was proposed
until it was released for ratification, the debates in both the
House and the Senate consisted, for the most part, of refer-
ence only to the political sections of the proposal. But what
significant debates there were tended to show that Congress
was still concerned with the national protection of natural
or civil rights of persons or citizens.35 While much has been
written about the development of the fourteenth amendment,
there is one point on which'all historians agree: the fourteenth
amendment "was designed to place the constitutionality of
33 TENBRoK 179, 180.
34 See, e.g., TENBROEK 156-80.
35 Id. at 192.
80 Id. at 183, 184.
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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the ... civil rights bill [Civil Rights Act of 1866] . . .be-
yond doubt."3 6
One historian, after making a close analysis of the leg-
islative history, stated that Congress had growing doubts that
the thirteenth amendment had the capacity to sustain the
far-reaching legislative programs for protection of civil rights.
However, they did feel that the fourteenth amendment would
give Congress the power to declare that certain rights should
be guaranteed to all citizens.37
Another historian noted that during the House debates
on the fourteenth amendment, a number of speakers stated
that the purpose was to "make certain the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866]." 38 Also, the debates evi-
dence a concern that this amendment would be required to
"place the provisions of the Civil Rights Act beyond t h e
power of shifting congressional majorities."39
It would seem that, although the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was enacted under the authority of the thirteenth amend-
ment and before the fourteenth amendment became law,
the real constitutional basis for the Act is section five of the
fourteenth amendment. 40 This observation is based on the
idea that both the Act and the amendment were designed
to prohibit discrimination by the states.
3 FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH A ENDmENT 45
(1908), cited in Robinson, The Possibility of a Frontal As-
sault on the State Action Concept, with Special Reference
to the Right to Purchase Real Property Guaranteed in 42
U.S.C. § 1982, 41 NornE DAmE L. REV. 455, 460, 461 (1966).
38 TENBROEK 208.
39 Id. at 209.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. 14, §§ 1, 5 provide in pertinent parts:
Section 1. No state shall m a k e or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of thii atticle.
1970]
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III. CASES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
This Act, from which 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is derived, has had
a relatively quiet existence, but nonetheless, a very incon-
sistent one. In United States v. Harris there was a feeling
that this section was enacted by virtue of and constitutionally
grounded in the thirteenth amendment.4 1 Subsequently, a fed-
eral district court held that Section 1982 was a proper exer-
cise of the powers granted by the thirteenth amendment since
that amendment guaranteed the rights of citizenship and the
right to buy or lease property.42
Shortly after the Harris case, the Civil Rights Cases43
were decided; and the Court, in dictum, said of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866:
This law is clearly corrective in its character, in-
tended to counteract and furnish redress against State
laws and proceedings, and customs having the force
of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified....44
This statement suggests that Section 1982 would only be en-
forced under the state action doctrine of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This view was, to all appearances, reinforced by
Hurd v. Hodges.45 In that case the Court pointed out that
the original act was re-enacted after the passage of t h e
fourteenth amendment because there were serious doubts that
the thirteenth amendment would support it; and since the
original act and the fourteenth amendment passed in the
same Congress, they were closely related in the objective
of being aimed at state action.4 0 Nevertheless, this case held
41 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882).
42 United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E. D. Ark. 1903).
43 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
44 Id. at 16.
4r 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
" Id. tit -33.
156 [Vol. 6, No. 2
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that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive agreement
would violate the predecessor of Section 1982.47
These were the precedents for the construction of Section
1982 when the Supreme Court was faced with Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.48 The principal issue presented by Jones was:
[W]hether purely private discrimination, unaided
by any action on the part of the government, would
violate § 1982 if its effect were to deny a citizen the
right to rent or buy property solely because of his
race or color.49
IV. CASE DEVELOPMENT PROHIBITING RACIAL DIS-
CRIMINATION IN HOUSING
A. PRIOR TO JONES V. ALFRED H. MAYER CO.
Since the Civil War and the emancipation of all Negro
slaves, the issue of whether Negroes are entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment to buy, sell, convey and lease real
property, as enjoyed by white citizens, has been shaded by the
court invoked doctrine of "state action". This doctrine arose
and developed in the case law since the Civil Rights Cases.50
The Supreme Court, prior to Jones and in line with the
Civil Rights Cases, concluded that the thirteenth amendment
merely abolished slavery and its incidents; that the legisla-
tive power under section one of the thirteenth amendment
extended only to the subject of slavery and its incidents; 1
and that the denial by an individual of equal accommoda-
tions, public conveyances and places of public amusement
imposed no badge of slavery which Congress had the power
to prevent by appropriate legislation. In addition, the Court
held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited "state action
47 Id. at 32.
48 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4) Id. at 419.
80 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
81 Id. at 23.
19701
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of a particular character and that individual invasion of in-
dividual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment. ' 52
Since 1883 the concept of "state action," in regard to the
issue of racial discrimination in private housing, has become
firmly entrenched; the Supreme Court consistently holding
that the requisite "state action" must be present before the
Court could invoke the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. But since the holding in the Civil Rights
Cases, the Supreme Court has broadened and expanded the
concept of "state action."
In Buchanan v. Warleyr3 the Court held that a municipal
ordinance which prohibited white as well as Negro owner-
ship of property in close proximity w i t h the other, so
as to maintain the public peace, was "state action" prohibited
by the fourteenth amendment. Also, the Court has found the
requisite "state action," thus a violation of the fourteenth
amendment, where a publicly owned and operated restaurant
refused to serve food or drink to a Negro.5 4
In Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co. 5 a city ordinance
authorized the transit company to formulate rules for the seat-
ing of passengers. In light of the "statutory" power conferred
on the transit company, the Fifth Circuit viewed the policy of
racially segregated seating in buses as being "state action" and
violative of the fourteenth amendment.
In Ming v. Horganr6 a California court found state action
in the licensing of a real estate broker who refused to sell
real estate to persons solely on the basis of race.
52 Id. at 11.
r3 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
54 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
55 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
5) 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 693 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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This expansion by the courts of the concept of "state
action" has, in the opinion of some writers, taken a new turn:
The issue must be whether the private organization
has moved into an area of sufficient public concern,
whether there is such 'interdependence' that the dis-
crimination is no longer private and personal."
Also, the Supreme Court in United States v. Guest 8 stated
that the involvement by the state need not be exclusive or
direct.59 We find further evidence of this view from the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Fuld: 60
Even the conduct of private individuals offends
against the constitutional provision if it appears in
an activity of public importance and if the state has
accorded the transaction either the panoply of its
authority or the weight of its power, interest and
support.6 '
However, prior to Jones, the concept of "state action" was
the only method used to attack racial discrimination in housing
because the fourteenth amendment was only applicable where
the requisite "state action" could be found. But see United
States v. Guest 62 and the following statement f r o m the
dissent of Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases:
There are burdens and disabilities which constitute
badges of slavery and servitude, and that the express
57 Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv.
347, 384 (1963).
z8 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
59 Id. at 755.
60 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.
2d 541 (1949).
01 Id. at 543, 87 N.E.2d at 555.
62 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966). Mr. Justice Clark, with whom
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Fortas join, concurring,
says that there can be no doubt that § 5, the enabling
clause, empowers Congress to enact legislation to punish
all conspiracies, with or without state action, that infringe
upon fourteenth amendment rights.
19701
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power ... to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
thirteenth amendment, may be exerted by legislation
of a direct and primary character, for the eradication,
not simply of the institution, but of its badges and
incidents, are propositions which ought to be deemed
indisputable. They lie at the very foundation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 .... [C]ongress, by the Act of
1866, passed in view of the thirteenth amendment,
before the fourteenth was adopted, undertook to re-
move certain burdens and disabilities, the necessary
incidents of slavery, and to secure to all citizens of
every race and color, . . . those fundamental rights
which are the essence of civil freedom, namely the
right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, and convey property as is enjoyed by white
citizens ....
This view, prior to the Jones case, was also supported by
a federal district court case;04 the view being that t h e
Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. § 1982, pursuant
to the thirteenth amendment guaranteed a citizen the right
to buy or lease property, and a violation of this right consti-
tuted a "badge of slavery" within the prohibitions of the
thirteenth amendment.
B. JONES V. ALFRED H. MAYER CO.
The Supreme Court ended private discrimination in
housing based solely upon race or color in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.65
The facts of the case are that private individuals refused
to sell Joseph Jones a house in the Paddock Woods community
of St. Louis County, Missouri, for the sole reason that he was
a Negro.
The basic issues of this case are: whether the Civil Rights
63 109 U.S. 3, 35 (1883).
4 United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
65 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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Act of 186666 purports to prohibit all racial discrimination,
private or public, in the sale and rental of property; and also,
whether Congress had the power to eradicate conditions that
prevent Negroes from buying property because of their race
or color under the thirteenth amendment.
The Court held that:
[Section] 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as
well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and
that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of
the power of Congress to enforce the thireenth amend-
ment.
67
The Supreme Court, in its interpretation of § 1982, gave
it an all-encompassing application. It seems that the Court
based its rationale on differences in wording between § 1 and
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.68 It distinguished § 1 from
§ 2 by holding that § 1, stating the right to purchase and
lease property, was to be enjoyed by Negroes as well as
white citizens and that their right was secure from interfer-
ence from the government or a private source. Further, the
Court reasoned that § 2, which provided for criminal prose-
cution, only prohibited a deprivation of rights based upon
race or color which was perpetrated "under color of law."69
Thus, the Court concluded that if § 1 had intended to do no
66 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, which provides in
pertinent parts:
That all persons born in the United States... are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude...
shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property . . .as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
67 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
68 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § § 1-2, 14 Stat. 27.
69 392 U.S. at 426.
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more than grant a relief from governmental interference
then § 2 would have been immaterial and irrelevant.
The Court through this decision has put teeth into the
thirteenth amendment, making it all encompassing as applied
to any racial discrimination. It reasoned that Congress, under
the thirteenth amendment, could determine what were badges
and incidents of slavery and prohibit them by appropriate
Igislation; and thus:
[I]f Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar
in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same
thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man [then
the Thirteenth Amendment is of no value]. At the
very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered
to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes
the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy,
the right to live wherever a white man can live. If
Congress cannot say that being a free man means at
least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment
made a promise the Nation cannot keep.70
V. CONCLUSION
Shortly before the decision in the Jones case, the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 had been enacted 1 and was to become
effective January 1, 1969. Title VIII of that Act72 provides for
a very comprehensive "fair housing" policy. The Court in
Jones, cognizant of the Civil Rights A c t of 1968, pointed
out that its opinion did not alleviate the need for such an Act
since its decision was not "a comprehensive housing law"
and since it did not deal with all facets of discrimination,
as does the 1968 Act.73
A careful reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 shows
that the Court, in Jones, has "by its construction of § 1982
70 Id. at 443.
71 Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 STAT. 73.
72 42 U.S.C. § 3601-19 (Supp. IV 1968).
73 392 U.S. at 412-16.
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. . . extended the coverage of federal 'fair housing' law far
beyond that which Congress in its wisdom chose to provide
in the Civil Rights Act of 1968".
74
Congress limited the application of the 1968 Act by ex-
cepting any single family house sold or rented by an owner.75
Thus, we have in the Jones case and the Civil Rights Act of
1968 a contradiction as to the amount of discrimination which
will be allowed. The Jones case bars all public and private
racial discrimination in housing; and the Civil Rights Act of
1968 specifically exempts single family housing from its cov-
erage of discriminatory acts. The Supreme Court will surely
be called upon to resolve this conflict.
It would seem that the exemption provided by Congress
in the 1968 Act is in line with the well-established principle
in property law that a property owner has the absolute right
of deciding to whom he wishes to convey his property. On
the other hand, the Court in Jones, while talking about the
right to buy and sell property, has seemingly established the
principle that, if one is a Negro, he has a greater right to buy
than to sell.
It is suggested that when the Court is faced with this
conflict, it should bring its holding in line with the current
legislative purpose. This could be done by reviewing its hold-
ing in the Jones case and then distinguishing it on a factual
basis, or by finding that Jones was decided before the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 was in effect.
Del Menge
George Ramey
74 392 U.S. at 478 (dissent).
7 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (b) (1) (Supp. IV 1968).
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